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Abstract. This paper aims at assessing how offenders allocate their effort amongst several crime typologies. 
Specifically, complementary and substitution effects are tested amongst number of recorded crimes. 
Furthermore, the extent to which crime is detrimental for economic growth is also tested. The case study is Italy 
and the time span under analysis is from 1981:1 up to 2004:4. A Vector Autoregressive Correction Mechanism 
(VECM) is employed after having assessed the integration and cointegration status of the variables under 
investigation. The main findings are that a bi-directional complementary effect exists between drug related 
crimes and receiving, whereas a bi-directional substitution effect is detected between robberies, extortions and 
kidnapping and homicides and falsity, respectively. Furthermore, economic growth produces a positive effect on 
the growth of homicides, receiving and drug related crimes; while, the growth in robberies, extortion and 
kidnapping and falsity have a crowding-out effect on economic growth.  
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I. Introduction 
Since Becker (1968), the standard economic model of crime has primarily been concerned 
with the criminal’s choice between legal and illegal activities. In this framework, the criminal 
is a rational agent that maximises his/her utility given his/her budget constraint. In the real 
world, however, the criminal does not have to choose only the optimal allocation of effort 
between legal or illegal activities, but he/she could allocate his/her effort between several 
crime offences. A general crime model has to assume that payoffs and sanctions in one crime 
may affect the level of activity in other crimes. Hence, the relationships between the different 
“submarkets of crime” (Jantzen, 2008) have to be taken into account in order to explain 
criminals’ behaviour. 
 In the Nineties, crime economic research has started to focus on the relationship existing 
amongst different types of crime. For example, Enders and Sandler (1993), within the 
terrorism economics literature, find that threats and hoaxes are complementary with 
skyjackings, hostagings and assassinations. Koskela and Virén (1997) show that an increase 
in punishment or arrest rates makes criminals switch from less to more profitable criminal 
activities.  The present paper, stemming from this strand of research, aims to test for either a 
complementary or substitution relationship amongst several types of crimes. The crime 
typologies considered are: number of recorded voluntary committed homicides, robberies, 
extortions and kidnapping, receiving, falsity and drug related crimes.  The analysis is also 
underpinned by an economics framework by including the real per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as an additional variable. This investigation fits into the current debate testing 
both the effects that economic growth produces on criminal activity but also highlights 
possible crowding-out effects running from illegal activity to legal economic activity. Via a 
Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM), it is possible to explore multiple economic 
correlations both in the short and long run. A set of dummy variables are also included in 
order to capture the impact of important policy measures such pardons and amnesties on 
crime rates that took place in Italy during the period under investigation. 
To this aim, quarterly Italian data over the period first quarter 1981 – fourth quarter 2004 
are employed. Italy can be considered as an interesting case study for several reasons. Firstly, 
an unprecedented increase in total crime offences has been observed over last 25 years, 
passing from 39.3 per 1,000 inhabitants in the year 1979 to 50.7 in 2004 (+35.7%). If the time 
span from 1993 up to 2007 is considered, the number of total crime offences increased by 
29.8%, in contrast with many Western countries, such as USA (-20.4%), Canada (-15.8%), 
the UK (-10.9%), France (-7.5%) and Germany (-6.9%) (Eurostat, 2009). From this point of 
view, this study makes an important contribution to explore the causes of this large increase 
by considering the relationship between the different types of crime, and between crime and 
economic growth.  
Secondly, the Italian crime pattern is characterized by a prevalence of property crimes 
(73.4% of total crime offences) which are better explained by economic motivations. The 
total thefts account for the 53.8% of the total crimes in Italy (2001), well above, for example, 
what is observed in the UK, 41.49% (Bolton, 2001), that is one of the countries with the 
highest crime rate in Europe (Eurostat, 2009). Furthermore, certain types of crime, such as 
robbery, extortion, receiving, falsity, are committed mostly by organized crime gangs. Hence, 
this study allows one to investigate the allocation of the organized crime criminal effort.  
 A promising field of research has developed around the estimation of the social cost of 
crime. It is well known that crime generates significant negative externalities, causing, 
tangible and intangible, direct and indirect costs for the community. A recent paper by Detotto 
and Vannini (2009) gauges the social cost of crime in Italy by analysing a subset of offences, 
such as street crimes, robbery, fraud and homicide. Their findings show that in the year 2006, 
the estimated total social cost was about € 40 billions, that represented 2.6% of Italian GDP. It 
is evident that in Italy the criminal activity has a significant impact on legal activities, and its 
estimate has important policy implications. 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on 
crime economics related to time series analysis. Section 3 describes the economic model 
adopted and the data used. Section 4 explains the methodology and the results are presented. 
Section 5 gives an account on the findings from the Granger causality test. The last section 
presents the main conclusions of this study. 
 
II. Literature review 
This section is aimed at giving an account on crime economic literature related to the time 
series analysis. Masih and Masih (1996) estimate the relationship between different crime 
types and their socioeconomic determinants within a multivariate cointegrated system for the 
Australian case (1960-1993). Within a Granger test framework, the authors establish the 
direction of the temporal causation between the variables showing the criminal activity 
positively responds to urbanization and bad economic conditions, but they fail to find a crime 
impact on the socioeconomic variables under study. 
 Using an Australian dataset (1964-2001), Narayan and Smyth (2004), within an ARDL 
model, examine the relationship amongst unemployment, real wage and seven different crime 
categories that are homicide, motor vehicle theft, fraud, break and enter, robbery, stealing, 
serious assault. They found that, in the short run, robbery and stealing Granger cause real 
income, while robbery and motor vehicle theft Granger cause unemployment. In the long run, 
income is Granger caused by unemployment, homicide and motor vehicle, whereas fraud is 
Granger caused by real income and unemployment. 
 Habibullah and Baharon (2009), applying an ARDL model to the Malaysian case (1973-
2003), analyse the relationship between real gross national product and different crime 
offences. The results indicate that, in all cases, the long run causal effect runs from economic 
variables to crime rates and not vice versa. 
 Chen (2009) implements a VAR model to examine the long-run and causal relationships 
among unemployment, income and crime in Taiwan (1976-2005). The results indicate the 
presence of long-run relationships amongst unemployment, income and theft and amongst 
unemployment, income and economic fraud. Moreover, Chen shows the presence of a long-
run level equilibrium relationship among unemployment, income and total crime. The 
Granger causality tests depict a neutral relationship among unemployment, income and all 
crime categories used 
 A common theme in the aforementioned studies is the investigation of crime in the 
context of separate and independent submarkets. They specify a different econometric model 
for each type of crime without considering possible relationships that may exist amongst 
various illegal activities. First attempts at closing this gap can be seen with the use of cross-
section techniques (Holtmann and Yap, 1978; Hakim et al., 1984; Cameron, 1987). In 
general, these studies find the presence of positive cross effect of imprisonment and arrest 
rates among several property crimes. Koskela and Virén (1997), for example, propose a 
theoretical choice model of crime switching that analyses the occupational behaviour of a 
representative rational agent between one legal and two criminal activities. These authors test 
the model within a cointegration and error correction framework using annual data from 
Finland for robberies and vehicle thefts for the time spam between 1951 and 1992. The 
findings show the presence of substitution between the two types of crime: namely, an 
increase in punishment or arrest rates makes criminals switch from less to more profitable 
activities.  
 Jantzen (2008) employs a Johansen’s cointegration method to estimate the long run 
equilibrium relationship existing between several crime types, namely murder, assault, 
robbery, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft. Augmented Granger causality tests are also 
conducted to identify the direction of causality between the variables. The results indicate the 
existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between property crimes. Besides, they are 
Granger caused by violent crimes such as murder and assault. 
 An interesting case study relates to the analysis of the substitution effect stemming from 
the economics of terrorism. By implementing a VAR model, Enders and Sandler (1993) study 
the behaviour of rational terrorists to measure the relationships between various terrorism 
attack modes, namely skyjackings, incidents involving a hostage, assassinations, threats and 
hoaxes and all other incident types. A set of dummy variables are included in order to capture 
the effect of exogenous policy interventions, such as the installation of metal detectors in 
airports or the retaliatory raid on Libya. The authors find that threats and hoaxes events are 
complementary with skyjackings, hostagings and assassinations. Moreover, they show the 
impact effects of policy intervention on each terrorism series. 
 From this literature review it emerges that the relationship between crime and economic 
variables, such as GDP and unemployment, has been extensively studied, especially within a 
time series framework. On the whole, ARDL models have been employed given the use of 
low frequency data due to the availability of relatively short-span dataset. Furthermore, a 
great focus on the investigation of the temporal relationship between legal and illegal activity 
has been given via the standard Granger causality test. Overall, the rather mixed evidence 
emerges on the type of temporal causality existing between the analysed variables, depending 
on the econometric approach and country analysed.  
 However, scarce attention has been given to the investigation on what extent offenders, 
regarded as rational individuals, allocate their efforts between legal and illegal activities, as 
well as amongst different types of crimes. To date, only a few studies exist on these specific 
economic issues. The present study, stemming from this latter strand of research, as provided 
in the literature review, can be regarded as novel. Possible substitution and complementary 
effects amongst several types of offences will be investigated within a multivariate framework 
and a quarterly frequency.  
 
III. Data description 
In this paper six crime typologies are employed: number of recorded attempted or committed 
intentional homicides (H), number of recorded robberies, extortions and kidnapping (R), the 
number of receiving - or dealings with stolen property (e.g. archaeological goods) - (RE), 
number of recorded falsity - such as fraud using altered or false documentation - (F), and 
finally the number of recorded drug crimes (DR); all these variables are defined per 100 
thousands inhabitants. Table 1 provides detailed definitions of the crime variables used in this 
study. As a further variable, the per capita real GDP is also employed. Quarterly Italian data 
from ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics) over the time span 1981:1 up to 2004:4 
are collected.  
 The empirical analysis has a twofold aim: firstly, to assess for either a substitution or 
complementary relationship amongst the different crime typologies and, secondly, to pick up 
possible crowding-out effects between crime and economic growth.  The variables under 
study have been transformed into a natural logarithmic specification (L), assuming the 
existence of a non-linear relationship. A graphical representation of the moving trend 
proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (calculated using Eviews 4.0) helps identifying the general 
trend of each series, as shown in Figure 1. An upwards trend characterises receiving (LRE) 
and falsity (LF), though the latter shows a reverse pattern at the end of the Nineties.  LR and 
LDR depict an upwards trend until the beginnings of the Nineties and thereafter show a more 
stable path of growth.  Finally, homicides are characterised by a cyclical pattern with a peak 
reached in the second half of the Eighties and a recrudescent of this crime occurred in the year 
2000.  
 
IV. VECM and empirical results 
The function under investigation is the following: 
LGDP = f (LH, LR, LRE, LF, LDR)              (1) 
where LGDP, LH, LR, LRE, LF and LDR are the afore mentioned variables. The multivariate 
system is mathematically defined as follows: 
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where [A1],… and [Ak] are the pµp (or 6µ6) matrices of parameters to be estimated; k is the 
number of lags be considered in the VAR; ε
t
 is the 1µ6 vector of the disturbance terms that are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right 
hand side variables.  
 The methodological framework employed to investigate the relationship amongst these 
variables consists of three steps. The first step is to test the order of integration. Table 2 gives 
the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and 
Shin (KPSS) and Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics. These tests are used to detect the 
presence of a unit root for the individual time series and their first differences. Overall, all the 
test statistics are congruent and indicate that the series are integrated of order I(1) in the level 
form but I(0) in their first differences (e.g. Engle and Granger 1987). Nevertheless, there is 
some discrepancy regarding the order of integration for LR. Application of the ADF test 
yields the unit root is rejected when applied to its first difference but there is no evidence 
when the test is applied to its level. KPSS suggests the series is I(1). Hence, overall there is 
ground to treat LR as stationary in its first difference. 
 Given the unit root results, the second step is to use the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
approach that Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) implemented to investigate 
the existence of a common long run equilibrium amongst I(1) variables. The joint F-test and 
the Akaike (AIC), Schwartz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) Information Criteria are used to 
select the number of lags required in the unrestricted VAR to ensure that residuals are white-
noise (i.e. the vector autocorrelation test in this case is F(180,197)=1.0352 [0.4054]). Thus, 
the chosen lag length is four accordingly (Garratt et al., 2003). The cointegration test results 
are presented in Table 3. Though, the null hypothesis of no cointegration fails to be rejected 
by the maximum likelihood (Max) statistic, at least a single significant cointegrating vector is 
identified using the trace statistic. Hence, one concludes that all variables are cointegrated, 
and causally related in each model. The calculated cointegrating vector (ECT), that is the 
residual from the long run equation, is then incorporated in its first lag in the error correction 
specification. 
 The third step of the analysis is to estimate an unrestricted vector error correction model 
(VECM) where the long run and short run information are simultaneously included:  
ttititt DMYYDY ε++Γ+Π= ∑
−
=
−−
K
1p
1i
1      (3) 
where: Yt = (LGDPt, …. ,LDRt) is a vector of all the endogenous variables defined above, 
expressed in their first difference (D) being I(1); Π is the long run part of the model, that 
contains the cointegrating relations (β) and the loading coefficients (α); Γ  is the matrix of the 
short run parameters to be estimated; DM contains all deterministic variables that is constants, 
linear trend and specified other dummy variables; ε
t
 is the vector of the disturbance terms that 
are assumed to be uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the 
right hand side variables. Specifically, the deterministic components of the system are the 
following: a linear trend included based on the vector joint F-test (4.61953 [0.001]); a set of 0-
1 dummy variables (d83q3, d85q3, d85q4, d86q1, d89q4, d91q1, d96q4, d00q1 and d03q4) 
that pick up possible leap and lag effects caused by specific government acts (e.g. amnesties, 
pardons, de-penalisations, structural reforms) as well as to avoid problems of non-normality in 
the diagnostics.  The advantage of a VECM model consists of it being an a-theoretic 
simultaneous system that allows one to include all the crime and economic variables 
endogenously. 
 The vector diagnostics of the unrestricted VECM are reported in Table 4. A problem of 
non-normality is still present at the 5% level; however, the inclusion of further deterministic 
dummy variables further worsens the estimation. Overall, the model is a congruent 
specification and the best system achievable. Hence, a general-to-specific simplification is 
used to reduce the system to an efficient and congruent encompassing specification (see 
Mizon, 1996; Hendry and Mizon, 1998 for detailed methodological issues). The final 
parsimonious models are reported in Table 5.  The coefficient restriction is based on the 10% 
level of significance threshold. The likelihood-ratio test of the over-identifying restrictions is 
Chi2(117) = 68.753[0.9999], hence the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. 
 DLGDP and DLDR are the best estimated models in terms of diagnostic statistics. The 
equations for DLH and DLRE show problems of autocorrelation, though at the 5% level and 
the equations for DLR and DLF depict non-normality problems. However, inefficiency issues 
are not uncommon in core macroeconometric models (e.g. Garratt et al., 2003). 
 In terms of long run equilibrium, the ECTt-1 turns out to be statistically significant in all 
the equations with the only exception for the receiving crime equation (DLRE), where only 
short run dynamics can be accounted for. Besides, in four of the models the sign is negative 
that implies the variables tend to converge to a common equilibrium. The fastest convergence 
is experimented in the DLDR equation.   
 The short run dynamics give insightful information on the relationships existing amongst 
the variables under investigation. Table 6 provides a summary of the main findings. The first 
equation DLH (homicides) denotes complementary effects with falsity and drug crimes, 
whereas there is a substitution effect between homicides and robberies, extortions and 
kidnapping (DLR). The first outcome can be explained by the fact that drug related crimes can 
be a cause of homicides. The second outcome is also reasonable since those who commit 
robberies, extortions and kidnappings are most likely to consider victims as an asset and it is 
in their own interest to keep them alive. Besides, robberies, extortions and kidnapping are 
important sources of funds for organised crime groups, while homicides are often instruments 
of control of the territory, not uncommon for example in the South of Italy. Thus, there seems 
to be a trade off between the activity of fund raising and territory occupation. 
 From the second equation (DLR), a substitution effect arises between robberies, extortions 
and kidnapping, and homicides, receiving and falsity, respectively; however, a 
complementary effect is detected between DLR and drug related crimes.  
 The third equation (DLRE) highlights a unique complementary effect between receiving 
and drug related crimes. Complementary effects of drug related crimes in the second and third 
equation can be explained by the fact that drug offenders are more likely to commit crimes, 
such as robberies and receiving, in order to fund a drug habit. 
 The fourth equation (DLF) results show a substitution effect between falsity and robberies, 
extortions and kidnapping (DLR), and drug related crime (DLDR), respectively. In addition, a 
complementary effect exists between falsity and receiving. 
 From the drug related crime equation (DLDR), a substitution effect emerges for homicides 
and a complementary effect for receiving. The former outcome can be easily justified with the 
fact that homicides are most unlikely to cause drug related crime; nevertheless, the opposite 
causality has been established in the first equation.  
 As a further step of the analysis, the relationship between crime categories and economic 
growth has been analysed. Overall, economic growth has a positive impact on the growth of 
homicides, receiving and drug related crime, whereas an increase in the economic growth will 
cause a reduction in the growth of robberies, extortions and kidnapping (DLR) (see last 
column in Table 6). 
 The reverse relationship is examined in the last equation (DLGDP). A crowding-out effect 
on the economic growth is detected for robberies, extortions and kidnapping (DLR) and falsity 
(DLF); whereas, an increase in the growth of homicides (DLH) and receiving (DLRE) have a 
positive effect on economic growth. The connection between homicides and economic growth 
is statistically significant although the causal relationship not clear (see Table 6). It is worth 
highlighting that Italy is a special case due to the presence of organised criminal gangs 
(Mafia, Camorra, etc); mafia groups use murders as a means to gain power, hence it is 
reasonable to believe that homicides rate increases as their illicit activities grow up along with 
GDP growth. In this regard, the Association of the Confederation of Commercial Activities 
(Confesercenti, 2008) estimates the total revenue of organised crime accounts for 130 billion 
euros, that is 9% of Italian GDP. The latter outcome is consistent with the possibility that 
receiving can produce multiplier effects in the Italian legal economic system.  
 
V. Conclusions 
  This paper has aimed to expand existing economic crime literature, by employing a more 
robust VECM analysis thanks to the use of quarterly data (1981:1-2004:4). Italy makes an 
interesting case study for the high frequency of organised crime and economic motivated 
crime, such as receiving, falsity, property crimes and so on. In this sense, we expect to find a 
rational behaviour among crime agents.  The objective of this study has been firstly to 
examine how criminals allocate their effort amongst different crime typologies, secondly to 
what extent crime affects economic growth, as well as economic growth affects criminal 
activity. 
 The pre-modelling results have shown that a long run unique common equilibrium exists 
amongst the criminal variables (i.e. number of recorded homicides; robberies, extortions and 
kidnapping; receiving; falsity; and drug related crimes) and GDP. On this basis, the VECM 
model has highlighted the following findings: firstly, economic growth produces a positive 
effect on the growth of homicides, receiving and drug related crimes, conversely, a negative 
effect on robberies, extortions and kidnapping; secondly, the growth in robberies, extortions 
and kidnapping and falsity has a crowding-out effect on economic growth, while homicides 
and receiving produce a positive effect on legal activities.   
 The VECM has also shown how offenders allocate their effort amongst the crime typologies 
analysed. Specifically, with regard to the short run dynamics, a bi-directional complementary 
effect has been detected between drug related crimes and receiving. Whereas, a bi-directional 
trade off effect has been highlighted between robberies, extortions and kidnapping, and 
homicides and falsity, respectively.   
 Further findings have shown that growth in drug related crimes increase growth in 
homicides but a trade off effect has also been highlighted when treating homicides as the 
dependent variable. 
 Although, Italian data have been employed in this study, the findings should be of interest 
and replicated for other countries. Economic issues, such as crowding-out effects of illegal 
activity and offenders’ allocation of their effort in criminal submarkets, have been so far 
under-researched despite its substantial importance to government interventions. This paper 
helps to shed new light on these topics. 
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Figure 1 Graphs of LH, LR, LRE, LF, LDR, LGDP and Hodrick-Prescott trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 List of crime variables (Number of recorder crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) 
Name  Definition Code 
Homicide Voluntary committed homicide H 
Robberies, extortions and 
kidnapping Robberies, extortions and kidnapping R 
Receiving 
A receiving offence is committed when a person who intentionally handles, 
receives, retains or disposes of stolen goods, knowing or having reasonable 
grounds to believe they have been stolen  
RE 
Falsity 
A falsity offence regards counterfeit of credit cards and currency, false seals 
(e.g. brand counterfeit, falsification of stamps or passports of the State) and 
falsifying documents (e.g. alteration of official documents and certificates) 
F 
Drug Offence of possession, production and trade of drugs DR 
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Table 2 Unit roots test on dependent and explanatory variables (sample: 1981:1- 2004:4) 
Variables Status ADF lags KPSS lags PP Lags 
LGDP c,t - I(1) -1.96 4  0.23*** 7 -1.68 5 
DLGDP c,t - I(0) -4.39*** 3  0.07 5 -6.72*** 4 
LH c - I(1) -1.34 7 0.63** 7 -2.29 11 
DLH c - I(0) -4.38*** 7 0.20 22 -10.26*** 24 
LR c,t - I(0) or I(1) -3.05** 2  0.26*** 6 -3.88** 4 
DLR c - I(0) -9.82*** 1  0.19 2 -14.40 2 
LRE c,t - I(1) -1.07 6  0.20** 7 -1.05 3 
DLRE c - I(0) -3.66*** 5  0.11 3 -9.88*** 3 
LF c - I(1) -1.13 0  1.15** 7 -1.06 2 
DLF c - I(0) -10.90*** 0  0.11 2 -10.90*** 1 
LDR c,t - I(1) -1.12 3 0.25*** 7 -2.77 3 
DLDR c - I(0) -8.33*** 2  0.23 49 -15.58*** 27 
Notes: (1) *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. (2) D denotes the first-difference 
operator.
 
(3) Number of lags set in the ADF test is set upon AIC criterion, whereas KPSS and PP test upon Newey-West 
bandwidth. (4) A constant and trend (c,t) are included upon a trend coefficient statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Johansen cointegration trace test  
Lgdp lh lr lre lf ldr  -  Sample: 1981:1 – 2004:4    -  4 lags  - constant 
H0:rank<= Trace 95% 99% Max 95% 99% 
0 111.61*** 94.15 103.18 38.47 39.37 45.1 
1 73.14** 68.52 76.07 29.55 33.46 38.77 
2 43.59 47.21 54.46 15.77 27.07 32.24 
3 27.81 29.68 35.65 15.09 20.97 25.52 
4 12.72 15.41 20.04 8.09 14.07 18.63 
5 4.63** 3.76 6.65 4.63** 3.76 6.65 
Notes: (1) **, *** denote that a test statistics at the 5% and 1 % levels of significance, respectively. (2) four lags and an 
unrestricted constant are added; equivalent results are obtained when including both the constant and the trend in the 
cointegrating space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Unrectricted VECM, vector diagnostic statistics 
tests distribution statistics p-value 
Vector autocorrelation  F(180, 126) 0.96841 0.5812 
Vector Normality  Chi^2(12) 25.005** 0.0148 
Vector heteroscedasticity Chi^2(12) 1225.1 0.8661 
Notes: (1) ** indicate significance at the 5% level  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 VECM – parsimonious specification  
Variables Models 
 DLGDP DLH DLR DLRE DLF DLDR 
DLGDPt-1 0.392  (0.092)*** - 
-4.893 
(1.754)*** - - - 
DLGDPt-2 - - 3.645 (1.838)* 
3.646 
(1.838)* - - 
DLGDPt-3 0.268 (0.095)*** 
2.423 
 (1.21)** 
-3.124 
(1.846)* 
-3.124 
(1.846)* - 
5.131 
(2.240)** 
DLGDPt-4 - - 4.653 (1.770)** 
4.653 
(1.770)** -  
DLHt-1 0.012 (0.006)** 
0.200 
(0.075)** 
-0.281 
(0.095)*** - - 
-0.401 
(0.143)*** 
DLHt-2 0.011 (0.006)* 
0.167 
(0.074)** - - - - 
DLHt-3 - -0.474 (0.074)*** 
0.241 
(0.092)** - - - 
DLHt-4 - - - - - - 
DLRt-1 - - -0.218 (0.081)** - - - 
DLRt-2 -- - -0.269 (0.079)*** - 
-0.273 
(0.076)*** - 
DLRt-3 -0.008 (0.005)* 
-0.106 
(0.060)* - - - - 
DLRt-4 - - - - -0.259 (0.071)*** - 
DLREt-1 - - - - 0.149 (0.073)** - 
DLREt-2 - - - 0.183 (0.089)** 
-0.160 
(0.072)** - 
DLREt-3 - - -0.173 (0.063)*** - - - 
DLREt-4 0.009 (0.004)** -  - - 
0.303 
(0.102)*** 
DLFt-1 - - -0.154 (0.075)** - - - 
DLFt-2 - 0.100 (0.061)* - - - 
0.259 
(0.071)*** 
DLFt-3 -0.013 (0.005)*** - - - - - 
DLFt-4 -  - - - - 
DLDRt-1 - 0.091 (0.035)** - - - 
-0.253 
(0.067)*** 
DLDRt-2 - - 0.119 (0.044)*** 
0.170 
(0.059)*** - - 
DLDRt-3 - -  - -0.125 (0.048)** 
-0.143 
(0.065)** 
DLDRt-4 
 
0.079 
(0.035)** 
-0.080 
(0.043)* - 
0.185 
(0.045)*** - 
Cit-1 -0.006 (0.002)*** 
-0.128 
(0.030)*** 
0.154 
(0.037)*** - 
-0.074 
(0.032)** 
-0.141 
(0.056)** 
Trend 0.000 (0.000)** 
0.004 
(0.001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** - 
0.002 
(0.001)** 
0.005 
(0.002)** 
d83q3 0.018 (0.005)*** - - - 
-0.191 
(0.069)*** - 
d85q3 - - - - - 0.702 (0.100)*** 
d85q4 - - -0.184 (0.071)** - - 
0.387 
(0.115)*** 
d86q1 - - - - - -0.752 (0.112)** 
d89q4 - 0.169 (0.060)*** 
0.308 
(0.073)*** 
-0.235 
(0.088)** - - 
d91q1 0.009 (0.005)* - 
0.162 
(0.070)**  
0.262 
(0.070)*** - 
d96q4 - - - 0.403 (0.089)*** - - 
d00q1 - 0.186 (0.057)*** - - 
-0.398 
(0.072)*** - 
d03q4 - 0.349 (0.053)*** - - - - 
Constant 0.003 (0.001)** - 
0.048 
(0.023)** 
0.047 
(0.026)* 
0.047 
(0.021)** - 
Sigma 0.005 0.057 0.072 0.086 0.073 0.110 
AR              F(5,50)     2.234 2.416** 2.201 2.534** 2.173 2.279 
Nor             Chi^2(2)       1.658 0.946 7.429** 0.290 16.965*** 0.685 
CHeter        F(4,67) 0.877 0.884 1.010 1.404 0.858 0.263 
Heter        Chi^2(61) 66.605 52.417 47.364 58.769 69.436 50.458 
Notes Table 5: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2) D denotes the first-
difference operator.
 
(3) Parsimonious VECM set upon joint F-test on coefficient restriction and information criteria. (4) 
Models run in Givewin 2.00 (2001). (5) AR = serial correlation; Norm = normality; CHeter= conditional heteroscedasticity; 
Heter = heteroscedasticity. (5) Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 6 Substitution/complementary effects and crowding-out effects on economic growth 
 Effects based upon the first significant lag at least at the 10% 
Variables DLH DLR DLRE DLF DLDR DLGDP 
DLH - S*  C* C** Pos** 
DLR S*** - S*** S** C*** Neg*** 
DLRE   -  C*** Pos* 
DLF  S*** C** - S**  
DLDR S***  C***  - Pos** 
DLGDP Pos** Neg* Pos** Neg***  - 
Notes: Effects based upon the first significant lag at least at the 10% (see Pindyck, and Rubinfeld, 1991); related coefficients 
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) respectively. 
